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Abstract Collective adjustment of pension rights is a way to keep defined benefit
systems tenable. In asset liability management (ALM) models presented in the lit-
erature these decisions are modeled both at the aggregate level of the liabilities as a
whole and at a more detailed level. In this paper we compare the approximate aggre-
gate approach to the accurate detailed approach for the average earnings scheme with
conditional indexation. We prove that the aggregate approach leads to one-sided errors.
Moreover, we show that for semi-realistic data these biases are considerable.
Keywords Asset liability management · Pension funds · Indexation
1 Introduction
In the current economic climate, the risks associated with the pre-millennium defined
benefit schemes (DB), where benefit payments are fixed and contributions vary, are
regarded to be too high and too unevenly spread among the stakeholders involved.
This awareness grew by the severe drop in funding ratios (assets over liabilities) of
DB pension funds in the beginning of the new millennium. This was due to two simul-
taneous developments on the financial markets. On the one hand, the value of the
assets of pension funds dropped because of collapsing stock markets. On the other
hand, the historically low interest rates resulted in high values for the liabilities. In DB
schemes, financial distress can only be averted by raising contributions. Meanwhile,
the ageing of the Western populations implies that contribution bases become smaller.
In the coming years the population at retirement age over the population at working
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age, is prognosticated to rise sharply. For instance, for the Netherlands this ratio is
expected to double the coming 30 years. Besides it’s weakening ability of absorbing
shocks, the contribution instrument is considered to be unfair, since all pain is felt by
the sponsor (company) and active participants (employees) and none by the passive
participants (retirees), see e.g. van Ewisk (2005) and Bovenberg and Knaap (2005).
Consequently, DB schemes are abolished or the implementation is altered. In the US
and the UK we see a shift to defined contribution (DC) schemes, where contributions
are fixed and benefit payments vary. Alternatively, in the Netherlands the prevailing
view is to maintain DB based schemes because of the security for the participants.
However, the pension rights are no longer fully corrected for inflation each year, which
was the case before 2000. The correction for inflation, which is called indexation, is
now truly conditional. Moreover, in the Netherlands there is the emergence of the col-
lective defined contribution (CDC) scheme, where rights can be collectively lowered
as well. As a consequence, in these schemes the financial position of a pension fund
can be actively influenced not only on the asset side via the financing and investment
strategies, but on the liabilities side via the adjustment strategy as well. Collectively
not granting indexation or lowering the pension rights leads to a lower value of the
liabilities. In this paper we focus on the DB scheme with conditional indexation, which
is described in detail in Sect. 2. We believe that the results found can be extended to
CDC schemes, too.
Strategic asset liability management (ALM) models (both simulation and optimi-
zation) are used to support pension fund decisions in the medium and long term. The
new situation requires models that include the adjustment policy. Obviously, to be
valuable such models must provide a valid abstraction of the adjustment process in
practice. In Klein Haneveld et al. (2009) we show that for an accurate modeling of
indexation one needs to subdivide the liability related quantities by year of accrual of
the underlying rights. Intuitively this can be seen by recalling that indexation is cor-
rection for inflation and realizing that the year of accrual determines the inflation the
rights have been exposed to. However, in the literature, indexation decisions are gen-
erally modeled at the total liabilities level, see e.g. the optimization model of Drijver
(2005) and the simulation model of Ponds and van Riel (2007). This aggregation is
incorrect, since the proportional contribution of rights accrued in a certain year differs
for the various liability related quantities, as we will see in Sect. 4. This information
is lost in the aggregation.
The contribution of this paper is a thorough analysis of the errors induced by the
aggregate approach. First, a theoretical assessment learns us the nature of the errors.
Second, a numerical illustration indicates the sizes of the errors. One should realize
that these errors occur at each decision moment considered in the pension fund ALM
model. Typically, optimization ALM models constitute around 5 decision moments,
whereas simulation ALM models constitute at least 30 decision moments. Therefore,
the errors strongly degrade the validity of the models.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the build-
up of pension rights in average earnings (AE) schemes with conditional indexation.
Modeling of conditional indexation in ALM models, which concerns the accurate
detailed level approach and the aggregate approximation, is the topic of Sect. 3. In
Sect. 4 we theoretically show that the aggregate approximation results in biased errors.
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The sizes of these errors are investigated for semi-realistic data in Sect. 5. Finally,
Sect. 6 summarizes and touches upon the implications for ALM models.
2 Individual pension rights in AE schemes
In an AE scheme, the rights gained in a certain year are a percentage of the partici-
pant’s wages for that year. Due to inflation the purchasing power of these rights will
diminish with the years. In the traditional Dutch DB setting (before 2000) all rights
were corrected fully for inflation each year (though officially it was conditional). This
correction for inflation, which typically concerns wage inflation, price inflation, or a
combination of both, is called indexation. In the current AE schemes with conditional
indexation, indexation is indeed conditional depending on the financial situation of
the fund. In general, this indexation process is executed as follows. At the end of
year the indexation decision concerning last year’s inflation is made. This concerns
a factor with which all rights are multiplied. This factor must be at least one, as the
rights as accrued are guaranteed, and it must not exceed the inflation factor. Moreover,
incomplete indexation, i.e. indexation lower than inflation can be repaired at a later
stage. However, such a repair is not retroactive, it only applies to disbursements after
the repair. In general, once granted indexation cannot be turned back. Below we give
a more detailed description.
Suppose a participant j joins the pension fund in year s0, then he/she will accrue
new rights every year t for s0 ≤ t ≤ t j (65), where t j (65) denotes the year that the
participant turns 65 and retires. Rights accrued in year t in an AE scheme equal the
accrual rate, typically 2%, times the pension basis, which is the pensionable wages
corrected for the state old-age provision. Denoting the pension basis in year t by Pjt
the newly accrued rights R+j t are
R+j t =
{
a Pjt for s0 ≤ t ≤ t j (65);
0 for t > t (65),
where a is the accrual rate. These new rights entitle the participant to be paid the
amount R+j t yearly from t j (65) till his/her death. The rights as accrued are guaranteed.
The total guaranteed rights at time t , which are also called the nominal rights result





Due to inflation the purchasing power of rights accrued in year t reduces every year.
The purchasing power is preserved if after accrual the rights are multiplied with the
inflation factor every year. Full compensation for inflation leads to what we call fully
indexed rights. For the case of compensation for wage inflation these are given by the
recursion
R jt = wt R j,t−1 + R+j t , (1)
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Fig. 1 Fully-indexed rights over nominal rights in an AE scheme for an example working career
where wt denotes the wage inflation factor for year t . The existing rights are corrected
for inflation and the newly accrued rights, which do not need any correction, are simply







with W st =
∏t
r=s+1 wr the accumulated inflation that rights accrued in year s have
been exposed to till time t . We let W tt := 1. Note that we need to consider explicitly
all different years of accrual, i.e. only considering the nominal rights is insufficient.
To indicate the magnitude of the differences between the nominal and fully indexed
rights, Fig. 1 shows for a stylized working career the ratios of the fully indexed rights
over the nominal rights for each time-point of the career. We assume a fixed wage
inflation of 3% every year and a career jump every 10 year of 5%. The accrual rate
used is 2%. We see that the ratio increases directly with a breaking point at retirement.
During the working years the newly accrued rights mitigate the inflation effect.
The actual rights, which determine what the participant is paid during retirement,
lie between the nominal rights, which are guaranteed, and the fully indexed rights,
which are striven for, and depend on the indexation decisions of the pension fund. At
the end of each year, the board of the pension fund decides by how much all old rights
will be indexed, with a maximum of the wage inflation of that year. Let ιt be the initial
indexation decision for year t , i.e. the nominal rights multiplier, then it must hold that
1 ≤ ιt ≤ wt . (2)
Besides initial indexation concerning the last year, it is also possible that past index-
ation decisions are repaired. The repair applies, however, only to future disbursements.
Let δst ≥ 0 be the repair at time t of the initial indexation decision taken at time s
123
Collective adjustment of pension rights in ALM models 141
with s < t . The nonnegativity condition on the repair expresses that once granted
indexation cannot be taken back. The simple indexation decision for year s at time t
(s < t), which we denote by i st , equals the initial indexation plus the sum of all repairs:




for which the following conditions hold:
1 ≤ i st ≤ ws, (3)
i st ≥ i st−1, (4)
where (3) is the equivalent of (2), and (4) is implied by the nonnegativity of the repairs.
To calculate the actual value at time t of rights accrued in year s we need to multiply
the nominal rights with the indexation decisions at time t for all years in between. So,
for each year of accrual s there is a different indexation multiplier, which we call the












Note that we need to consider explicitly all different years of accrual, i.e. only con-
sidering the nominal rights is insufficient, as is the case for the fully indexed rights.
3 Conditional indexation and ALM models
ALM models support strategic pension fund decisions, which involves the financial
position in the medium and long term. In this setting the value of the total liabilities
and the total disbursements resulting from the individual pension rights are of impor-
tance. Preferably, the whole ALM model is formulated at this total pension fund level,
since including the rights of all individuals explicitly puts a computational burden on
the ALM model. In the previous section we saw how individual rights are influenced
by indexation decisions. The question now is how to translate this to indexation deci-
sions in an ALM model. In this section we describe the accurate detailed approach
and the erroneous aggregate approach introduced before, but not before showing how
the value of the liabilities and the disbursements are calculated from the individual
pension rights.
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All is formulated in a typical discrete time ALM setting. We split the planning hori-
zon in T years, where the resulting decision moments are denoted by an index t . Time
t = 0 is the current time and t = T is the length of the horizon. Year t (t = 1, . . . , T )
is the span of time [t − 1, t).
3.1 Liabilities and disbursements
In this section it is explained how the total liabilities and disbursements are deducted
from given individual rights. Exposure of these relations provides us with important
information for the modeling of indexation in ALM models. In our deduction of the
liabilities and disbursements we encounter again the three versions nominal, fully
indexed, and actual. As before, the first two are predetermined as dictated by the
pension contract, whereas the latter depends on yearly decisions by the pension fund
board.
Let us first consider the expected benefit payments, which are important building
blocks. These are the disbursements the fund expects to make in the future given the
present rights, and are calculated on basis of the rights, ages, and survival probabilities
of the participants. The expected benefit payment in year u > t is a fraction of the
rights present at time t . Letting e jt (u), with 0 ≤ e jt (u) ≤ 1, be this fraction for
participant j , the nominal expected benefit payment to participant j is
B jt (u) = e jt (u)R jt . (7)





B jt (u), (8)
where Jt is the set of participants of the fund at time t . The fully indexed and actual
expected benefit payments follow by replacing the nominal rights by the fully indexed
and actual rights, respectively. Note that aggregation over the participants lets the
accrual structure unaffected.
Discounting the expected benefit payments gives the value of the liabilities. So, the




dt (u)Bt (u), (9)
where U > T is the last year of benefit payments as expected at the horizon T and
dt (u) is the discount factor for discounting payments at time u to time t . The values
of the fully indexed and actual liabilities follow by discounting the corresponding
expected benefit payments. In addition, it is common in ALM studies to distinguish
multiple participant groups, e.g. active and passive participants. Therefore we intro-
duce Lkt , Lkt , and Lkt as the values of the nominal, fully indexed, and actual liabilities
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Collective adjustment of pension rights in ALM models 143
to a participant group k, which depend on the rights owned by the members of the
group.
The disbursements in a certain year depend on the rights of the retirees. Let Rrt be
the nominal rights of the retirees at time t , then the nominal disbursements in year
t + 1 are
Bt+1 = Rrt . (10)
The other versions are determined similarly.
In ALM models the liability side of the problem is represented by the value of the
liabilities (per participant group) and the disbursements. As until recently all liabilities
were fully corrected for inflation every year, the value of the fully indexed liabilities
and the fully indexed disbursements were parameters of the models, and the other
two versions were not necessary. For the current AE schemes with conditional index-
ation, the nominal and fully indexed values are parameters, providing lower and upper
bounds for the actual values, which are based on the pension fund decisions. In Sect. 2
we discussed how to model this at the individual level. The question is now, how to
include indexation decisions at the total pension fund level of ALM models.
3.2 Modeling indexation at the detailed level
For an accurate modeling of indexation it is not necessary to introduce individuals
in ALM models, which would lead to tractability problems. It is sufficient to subdi-
vide the value of the liabilities and the disbursements by the years of accrual of the
underlying rights. This follows from (6) and the linearities in (7)–(10). Accordingly,
we introduce Lst , Lskt , and B
s
t as the nominal values at time t due to rights accrued
in year s. The indexation decisions in the aggregate approach are the accumulated
indexation decisions as introduced in (5). The actual values are then
Lst = I st Lst , (11)
Lskt = I st Lskt , (12)
Bst+1 = I st Bst+1. (13)
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where sI is the latest moment that all rights were fully indexed. All rights accrued
before sI can be regarded as accrued in year sI . In addition to these accounting rules
we need accumulated versions of the restrictions on the indexation decisions as given
in (3) and (4). These are:












. This completes the accurate modeling of index-
ation in ALM models.
The actual value over the nominal value of the liabilities, which we call the aggre-





























t = Lt .
Hence, the aggregate indexation level is a convex combination of the accumulated
indexation decisions.
3.3 Modeling indexation at the aggregate level
A drawback of the approach stated above is that it involves quite a number of auxil-
iary parameters and variables (compared to the fixed liabilities case). An approximate
approach with only a minimal amount of extra work is what we call indexation at the
aggregate level. Here, the indexation decisions are modeled at the level of the liabilities
as a whole, i.e. different years of accrual are not discriminated. The aggregate index-
ation level It , which above is a state variable resulting from the indexation decisions,
is now the only decision variable involving indexation. The actual liabilities are thus
Lt = It Lt .
The approach provides approximations of the value of actual liabilities to specific
participant groups and actual disbursements in
Lˆkt = It Lkt , (18)
Bˆt+1 = It Bt+1. (19)
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Translation of the constraints (3) and (4) leads in this case to
1 ≤ It ≤ LtLt
, (20)
It ≥ It−1. (21)
To assess the quality of the aggregate approach, we need to compare the approximate
actual values in (18) and (19) and constraint (21) to the accurate counterparts. Note
that constraint (20) is valid in the detailed approach as well and cannot lead to errors.
The comparison is complicated by the fact that in general an aggregate indexation
level It can be attained by multiple choices for I st (si ≤ s ≤ t). Nevertheless, in the
next section we show that regardless of this choice, the aggregate approach results in
one-sided errors.
4 Aggregation errors
In this section we investigate the approximation errors in the aggregate approach.
As we will see, these errors result from the difference in proportional contribution
of rights accrued in a certain year for the various liability quantities. This leads us to
three main results. First, it is shown that the actual disbursements are always underesti-
mated in the aggregate approach. Second, the values of the actual liabilities subdivided
into participant groups are wrongly calculated. Third, the lower bound on next year’s
indexation implied by the indexation process is too tight in the aggregate approach.
In addition to these biases, the aggregate approach leaves a fixed distribution of the
indexation over the years of accrual, which is too confining.
4.1 Modus operandi
To assess the quality of the aggregate approach we adopt the following method. For
given detailed indexation decisions I st , where s ranges from sI to t , we compare the cor-
rect values of the relevant variables/constraints to the approximations obtained when
using the corresponding aggregate indexation level It . Application of the following
proposition proves to be useful.
Proposition 1 Let p, q, x ∈ Rn be given such that
1. x j is monotonous non-increasing in j and x1 > xn ;
2. p j , q j ≥ 0 for all j and ∑nj=1 p j = ∑nj=1 q j = 1;
3. there is a k with 1 ≤ k < n such that p j > q j for 1 ≤ j ≤ k and p j < q j for
k + 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Then it holds that
n∑
j=1
p j x j >
n∑
j=1
q j x j .
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Proof Introducing a j := p j − q j , proving the above amounts to proving∑n
j=1 a j x j > 0. We have that
n∑
j=1
a j x j = a1 x1 +
k∑
j=2
a j x j +
n−1∑
j=k+1
a j x j + an xn
≥ a1 x1 +
k∑
j=2
a j xk +
n−1∑
j=k+1
a j xk + an xn (22)
= a1 x1 +
n−1∑
j=2
a j xk + an xn
= a1 x1 + (−a1 − an)xk + an xn (23)
= a1(x1 − xk) + an(xn − xk)
> 0, (24)
where (22) follows from (a) and a j > 0 for j ≤ k and a j < 0 for j > k, (23) from∑n
j=1 a j = 0, and (24) from x1 > xk or xk > xn due to (a) and a1 > 0 and an < 0.unionsq
We can interpret Proposition 1 as follows. The xi can be considered as realizations of a
discrete random variable X , and the p j and q j as elements from probability measures
P and Q. The probability measure P gives the higher values of x more mass than Q.
As a result,
EP[X ] > EQ[X ].
The pertinence of Proposition 1 in our indexation context follows from noting that
the decisions I st at time t , where s ranges from sI to t , satisfy condition (1) for aggre-
gate indexation levels It > 1, which we call non-trivial indexation. The fact that I st
is non-increasing in s, follows from the first inequality of (16). Recall that I tt = 1,
as the just accrued rights cannot be indexed. Since It is a convex combination of the
non-increasing I st , it follows that for It > 1 it holds that I
sI
t > 1 and thus I
sI
t > I tt .
Furthermore, in the examination of the aggregate approach we will face weights that
together with lst satisfy conditions (2) and (3), as the actual values over the nominal
values of other quantities than the liabilities are convex combinations of the detailed
decisions as well. In this way, we can prove that the aggregate approach leads to biases.
4.2 Biased actual disbursements
The indexation at time t determines the value of the actual disbursements in year t +1.
The difference between the actual disbursements in the aggregate and the detailed
model is
Bˆt+1 − Bt+1, (25)
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which we call the disbursement error. Application of the aggregate model definition
(19) gives






where the last equality follows from It = ∑ts=sI lst I st , see (17). In the detailed model














bst+1 I st ,




t+1 = 1. Conse-




(lst − bst+1)I st .
The ratios bst+1 and lst are, respectively, the parts of the nominal disbursements and
nominal liabilities accounted for by rights of year s. Whereas bst+1 only concerns
the payments in year t + 1, lst concerns all remaining (discounted) expected benefit
payments. As older rights have less remaining benefit payments than newer rights, for
older rights, i.e. s close to sI , it holds that bst+1 > lst , while for newer rights, i.e. s close
to t , it holds that bst+1 < lst . Consequently, it is plausible to assume the following.
Property 1 There is an index sˆ (sI ≤ sˆ < t) such that bst+1 > lst for s ≤ sˆ, and
bst+1 < lst for s > sˆ.
Application of Proposition 1 gives that for non-trivial indexation
t∑
s=sI










(lst − bst+1)I st < 0.
Hence, the disbursement error is negative for all non-trivial indexation decisions. Put
differently, indexation at the aggregate level results in underestimation of the actual
disbursements.
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4.3 Incorrect values of actual liabilities to participant groups
The indexation at time t determines the value of the actual liabilities to the partici-
pant groups at time t . The difference in these values in the aggregate and the detailed
model is
Lˆkt − Lkt ,
which we call the participant group liabilities error. The definition at the aggregate
level, as specified in (18) can be rewritten as






where the last equality follows from It = ∑ts=sI lst I st , see (17). Application of the





















kt = 1. Consequently, the




(lst − lskt )I st .
In Klein Haneveld et al. (2009), we consider a division into active (k = 1) and passive
participants (k = 2). Active participants own the largest proportions of the newer
rights, whereas passive participants own the largest proportions of the older rights.
For this reason we assume the following for the active participants.
Property 2 There is an index s1 (sI ≤ s1 ≤ t) such that ls1t < lst for s ≤ s1, and
ls1t > l
s
t for s > s1.















(lst − ls1t )I st > 0. (26)
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Hence, the actual liabilities error for the active participants, which we call the active
liabilities error, is positive for all non-trivial indexation decisions. Put differently,
the value of the actual liabilities to active participants is thus overestimated in the
aggregate approach.
For the passive participants we generally have the following.
Property 3 There is an index s2 (sI ≤ s2 ≤ t) such that ls2t > lst for s ≤ s2, and
ls2t < l
s
t for s > s2.















(lst − ls2t )I st < 0. (27)
Hence, the actual liabilities error for the passive participants, which we call the
passive liabilities error, is negative for all non-trivial indexation decisions. Put differ-
ently, the value of the actual liabilities to passive participants is thus underestimated
in the aggregate approach.
4.4 Biased lower bound on next year’s indexation
The indexation at the next decision moment is intertwined with the indexation at the
current decision moment, since once granted indexation cannot be turned back. More
specifically, the indexation at time t determines a lower bound on the indexation at
time t + 1. The lower bound at time t + 1 in the aggregate approach, which we denote
by Iˆ lbt+1, is given in (21), i.e.






At the detailed level, for each year of accrual it must hold that
I st+1 ≥ I st ,
which follows from i st+1 ≥ i st , i t+1t+1 ≥ 1, and I st =
∏t
r=s+1 irt . Hence, the lower
bound on the aggregate indexation level in the detailed approach can be found by
letting I st+1 = I st for sI ≤ s ≤ t and I t+1t+1 = 1 (by definition, see (5)). The resulting
lower bound, which we denote by I lbt+1, is given by
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lst+1 I st + lt+1t+1
The difference in lower bound for the aggregate and detailed approach is
Iˆ lbt+1 − I lbt+1, (28)
which we call the lower bound error. This error can be rewritten to
t∑
s=sI
(lst − lst+1)I st − lt+1t+1.
Conveniently introducing I t+1t = 1 and lt+1t = 0, the difference in bounds becomes
t+1∑
s=sI
(lst − lst+1)I st . (29)




t = 0. Moreover,
for the older rights lst will be larger than lst+1, because the benefit payments in year
t + 1 that were part of lst are no part of lst+1. This leads to the following assumption.
Property 4 There is an index sˆ (sI ≤ sˆ < t) such that lst > lst+1 for s ≤ sˆ and
lst < lst+1 for s > sˆ.
Application of Proposition 1 gives that for non-trivial indexation expression (29) is
greater than zero. Hence, the lower bound error is positive, for all non-trivial index-
ation decisions. Put differently, the lower bound on the aggregate indexation level at
time t + 1 is thus overestimated when indexing at the aggregate level.
4.5 Fixed indexation distribution
So far, we only discussed ‘accounting’ errors resulting from the use of a single aggre-
gate indexation decision. We paid little attention to the fact that a certain aggregate
indexation level can be attained by multiple choices for the detailed indexation deci-
sions. However, these different choices do lead to different outcomes. Concerning the
participants, in Klein Haneveld et al. (2009) we show that active participants prefer the
newest rights to be indexed, i.e. the most recent wage inflation to be corrected, whereas
passive participants prefer the oldest rights to be indexed. Moreover, different choices
result in different disbursement patterns and different lower bounds on the indexation
at the next decision moment. Indexation at the aggregate level does not allow for these
choices, as there is only one indexation decision for each decision moment, which
further invalidates the aggregate approach.
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5 Numerical illustration
In the previous section, we proved that the aggregate approach to indexation leads to
biases. To which degree this happens is investigated here. For semi-realistic data, as
obtained from ORTEC (http://www.ortec.com), we calculate the aggregate errors as
indicated in Sects. 4.2 to 4.4. The choice aspect of Sect. 4.5 is reflected in the use of
two choices for the detailed decisions for each aggregate level considered, namely one
choice reflecting the interests of the active participants and one reflecting the interests
of the passive participants. The magnitude of the errors found is considerable and
increases with the number of accrual years that need to be taken into account.
5.1 Data
We consider the fictitious Hollandia pension fund, which is constructed by ORTEC
to represent a typical Dutch pension fund. We distinguish two participant groups,
namely the active (k = 1) and the passive participants (k = 2). The latest moment
that all liabilities were fully indexed is fixed to ultimo 2000, i.e. sI = 2000. Conse-
quently, all rights accrued before 2000 can and are regarded to be accrued in 2000.
To investigate the effect of the number of years of accrual that need to be taken into
account, we evaluate two decision moments, namely ultimo 2006 (t = 2006) and
ultimo 2014 (t = 2014). Thus, for t = 2006 there are 7 different years of accrual,
while for t = 2014 there are 15 different years of accrual. The required data are listed
in Appendix A, where Table 3 concerns t = 2006 and Table 4 concerns t = 2014.
The pension liability data are provided by ORTEC Finance bv and generated with the
Pension Assets & Liabilities scenario Model (PALM) (Boender 1997; Boender et al.
1998, 2007). The wage increase factors for years 2001 to 2006 stem from Statistics
Netherlands (http://www.cbs.nl). From 2007 onwards, the factors equal the average
Dutch yearly wage increase factor.
A first step in our numerical analysis is to check whether Properties 1 to 4 hold for
the data. The involved convex weights lst , bst+1, ls1t , ls2t , and lst+1 follow from Tables 3
and 4 by straightforward computation. To investigate the assumed relations, where lst
is compared to the other weights, we list in Table 1 the differences of the other weights
with lst for t = 2006. We see directly that all differences have only one switch from
positive to negative or vice versa. Moreover, the patterns match with the assumed
relations. For instance, the index sˆ mentioned in Property 1 equals 2000. A similar
analysis of the data for t = 2014 confirms the assumed relations as well.
5.2 Results
In this section, we present the aggregate errors as defined in equations (25) and
(26)–(28) for the decision moments t = 2006 and t = 2014. To take into account
the effect of the height of indexation, the errors are calculated for different levels of
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2000 0.160 −0.126 0.131 −0.035
2001 −0.021 0.008 −0.008 −0.001
2002 −0.023 0.013 −0.013 −0.001
2003 −0.025 0.017 −0.018 −0.001
2004 −0.027 0.023 −0.024 −0.001
2005 −0.031 0.029 −0.030 −0.001
2006 −0.034 0.037 −0.038 −0.001
2007 − − − 0.040
Note that the relative and aggregate indexation level are equivalent, as Lt = It Lt .
A relative indexation of 0% belongs to the nominal situation, whereas 100% is the
fully indexed case. We calculated the aggregate errors for relative indexation levels of
0, 10, 20, . . . , 100%.
The detailed approach is represented by two choices for each level of relative/aggre-
gate indexation (recall that, in general, an aggregate indexation level can be attained
by multiple detailed decisions). These two choices are related to the two participant
groups. As mentioned in Sect. 4.5 active participants prefer correction of the newest
inflation, whereas passive participants prefer correction of the oldest inflation. One
choice for the detailed decisions is what we call active indexation decisions, which are
found by first correcting the most recent inflation, next the one but most recent inflation,
etc. This is continued until the relative indexation level is reached. The other choice
for the detailed decisions we consider are the passive indexation decisions, which are
found the opposite way, thus starting with the oldest not yet corrected wage inflation.
5.2.1 Decision moment t = 2006
Let us first have a look at the actual disbursements. In the aggregate approach, the
actual disbursements in a year are the nominal disbursements multiplied with the
aggregate indexation level. From Sect. 4.2 we know that this leads to actual disburse-
ments that are too low, irrespective of the particular detailed decisions accounting for
the aggregate level. In Table 2 the actual disbursements in both approaches for differ-
ent levels of relative indexation are given. The second column concerns the aggregate
approach, whereas the third and fourth column concern the active and passive deci-
sions in the detailed approach. The fourth column expresses the disbursement error as
a percentage of the actual disbursements for active detailed decisions. The sixth col-
umn expresses the same for the passive detailed decisions. As expected from Sect. 4,
we observe that for non-trivial indexation levels the aggregate approach gives too low
actual disbursements, irrespective which of the two detailed choices is considered.
Note the logical outcomes that no indexation results in the same actual disbursements
for both approaches, and that in case of full indexation the actual disbursements for
active and passive detailed decisions are equal.
The disbursement errors together with the other three errors are displayed in
Fig. 2. The horizontal axis represents the relative indexation, whereas the vertical axis
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Table 2 Actual disbursements for t = 2006 (in thousands of Euros)
Indexation (%) Aggregate Active detailed Passive detailed
0 77,845 77,845 0.00% 77,845 0.00%
10 78,959 79,011 −0.07% 79,201 −0.31%
20 80,073 80,224 −0.19% 80,558 −0.60%
30 81,186 81,455 −0.33% 81,891 −0.86%
40 82,300 82,726 −0.51% 83,204 −1.09%
50 83,414 83,997 −0.70% 84,516 −1.30%
60 84,527 85,310 −0.92% 85,788 −1.47%
70 85,641 86,622 −1.13% 87,059 −1.63%
80 86,755 87,956 −1.37% 88,289 −1.74%
90 87,868 89,312 −1.62% 89,502 −1.83%

































Fig. 2 Aggregate approach errors for t = 2006 and sI = 2000
displays the aggregate approach errors. The four groups indicated are the different
types of errors considered. For each group two situations are distinguished, namely
active detailed decisions and passive detailed decisions. Hence, the upper most line is
the aggregate approach error for the value of the active liabilities in the case of passive
detailed decisions. The line just beneath it is that error for the case of active detailed
decisions. The lines result from connecting the observations for the eleven levels of
relative indexation (as specified in the first column of Table 2).
The figure tells us that all errors have the sign as expected from Sect. 4: the active lia-
bilities and lower bound error is positive, and the passive liabilities and disbursement
error is negative. Moreover, the sizes of the errors are proportional to the level of
123
154 W. K. Klein Haneveld et al.
relative indexation. For the disbursements, active liabilities, and passive liabilities
errors we observe two striking patterns. First, the errors for passive detailed decisions
are larger than those for active detailed decisions. This is a result of the fact that for
passive detailed decisions, the oldest rights have priority over the newer rights. As the
difference in weights is by far the biggest for the oldest rights for the three quantities
considered (see the second row of Table 1), the errors are larger in the passive detailed
case. A second observation is that for active detailed decisions the errors deteriorate
the quickest at high levels of relative indexation, whereas for passive detailed deci-
sions the errors deteriorate the quickest at low levels of relative indexation. This can
be explained as follows. Consider some additional indexation in the active detailed
case. For low levels of relative indexation, emphasizing correction of the most recent
inflation results in additional indexation of almost all rights, see equations (5) and
(11), which is close to what the aggregate approach does (additionally index all rights
with the same factor). However, the higher the indexation level, the older the wage
inflation that is corrected, the less rights that are corrected by the additional indexation,
the larger the gap with the aggregate approach. For the passive detailed decisions the
opposite holds.
5.2.2 Decision moment t = 2014
To investigate the effect of more years of accrual considered, we generated the aggre-
gate errors for the decision moment t = 2014, while keeping the same latest moment
of full indexation (sI = 2000). The number of years of accrual is about doubled com-
pared to t = 2006. The results are represented in Fig. 3, which is constructed in the
same way as Fig. 2. The errors are more extreme than in case of t = 2006, while the
patterns are the same. Looking at full indexation (relative indexation of 100%) we
see that the lower bound error about doubles, the disbursements and passive liabilities
error about triples, and the active liabilities error about quadruples.
6 Concluding remarks
Collective adjustment of pension rights is a way to keep the DB system tenable. An
important pension scheme with collective adjustment is the AE scheme with condi-
tional indexation. For an accurate modeling of conditional indexation in ALM models,
the liabilities need to be subdivided according to the years in which the underlying
rights were accrued. However, in the literature indexation is generally modeled at
the total liabilities level, which is to be seen as an approximate approach. We proved
for the AE scheme with conditional indexation that application of this approximate
approach leads to biases in the disbursements, the value of the liabilities to participant
groups, and in the lower bound on the adjustment for the next decision moment. These
biases occur each decision moment considered. A numerical analysis of these biases
for semi-realistic data showed that the biases are considerable and increase with the
number of years of accrual that need to be considered. Moreover, different choices for
the detailed decisions that result in the same aggregate level, lead to different biases.
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Fig. 3 Aggregate approach errors for t = 2014 and sI = 2000
To which extent the validity of an ALM study based on the aggregate approach is
adversely affected by these biases mainly depends on the characteristics of the ALM
model and the pension fund considered. Concerning the first, long horizons, which are
typical for ALM models result in more years of accrual to be considered, and thus in
larger biases. Especially for long term simulation models this is a point of attention.
Concerning the latter, e.g., the less homogeneous the fund considered, the larger the
bias in the valuation of the liabilities to participant groups. In any case, when con-
structing an ALM model that includes adjustment decisions, one should be aware of
the drawbacks of the aggregate approach.
Appendix A: A Pension fund data











2000 1,572,053 662,707 909,346 69,496 1,566,341 –
2001 95,699 57,422 38,277 1,844 97,798 1.043
2002 96,134 63,110 33,025 1,732 98,332 1.043
2003 98,625 68,744 29,882 1,619 101,041 1.033
2004 97,135 74,210 22,925 1,458 99,545 1.025
2005 94,707 79,832 14,875 1,043 97,504 1.012
2006 90,088 85,730 4,358 653 93,074 1.010
2007 – – – – 88,826 1.030
Total 2,144,441 1,091,754 1,052,687 77,845 2,242,463 –
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2000 1,369,438 191,199 1,178,240 89,663 1,330,094 –
2001 102,228 23,353 78,875 4,421 101,672 1.043
2002 103,469 26,522 76,947 4,230 103,114 1.043
2003 107,555 29,781 77,775 4,224 107,414 1.033
2004 107,106 32,807 74,300 4,064 107,160 1.025
2005 107,647 36,169 71,478 3,799 108,028 1.012
2006 104,621 39,629 64,992 3,402 105,175 1.010
2007 103,697 44,406 59,291 2,915 104,918 1.030
2008 104,478 49,495 54,983 2,617 106,066 1.030
2009 103,989 55,144 48,845 2,274 105,882 1.030
2010 103,190 61,513 41,677 1,792 105,537 1.030
2011 101,696 68,538 33,158 1,390 104,352 1.030
2012 103,557 76,308 27,249 1,138 106,523 1.030
2013 101,476 84,831 16,644 795 104,705 1.030
2014 100,712 94,275 6,437 448 104,300 1.030
2015 – – – – 101,424 1.030
Total 2,824,858 913,968 1,910,890 127,171 2,906,364 –
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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